by Massimiliano Bonne
Introduction
The American plans for setting-up a radar station in the Czech Republic and an anti-missile defence position in Poland encounter substantial criticism in Russia. The American stationing plans, following the argumentation, were directed not against Iran, North Korea or other problematic states or terrorist organisations, but against Russia. The implementation of the plans, as President Putin warned during the 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy, would “inevitably lead to an arms race”. The Russian Chief of Staff Juri Balujewskij and the commander of the strategic rocket troops, General Nikolaj Solovyov have accordingly menaced that Moscow could drop out of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) Agreement for the complete disarmament of medium-range nuclear weapons and have also warned of the fact that anti-missile defence positions in Poland, the Czech Republic, “and other countries” could become “goals of the strategic rocket troops” of the Russian armed forces. In addition, Putin has associated NATO states’ refusal to ratify the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE), which was adjusted in 1999 to new conditions, to the Eastern enlargement of NATO and the “military encroachment ” of the United States (US) and NATO at the Russian borders: if NATO members do not ratify the modified agreement by the end of 2007, as a decree of the President of mid-July 2007 mentions, Russia would not feel committed anymore to the regulations of the CFE Treaty of 1990 and 1991.
Despite the menaces, Putin plays a key role. Surprisingly for all participants of the G8, he proposed to the US President George W. Bush to jointly use the radar facility rented by Russia in Azerbaijan. “It would make it possible to renounce to a stationing of US attack complexes in the context of the ABM program (also) in space”, he explained. At the meeting with Bush in Kennebunkport in the US Federal State of Maine Putin proposed the common
use of a radar station at that time still under construction in Armavir, in the Southern Russian district of Krasnodar. Besides, the former Russian Minister of Defence and at present unit deputy head of the government Sergej Ivanov explained that the radar facility could become part of a global defence system against ballistic missiles, in which neutral states such as Austria, Finland and Sweden could also participate.
The Russian reactions raise important questions:
Does Russia feel actually menaced by the US defence rockets in Europe and consequently should Moscow’s threats be taken seriously? Or is it a reaction to the official attitude about medium-term outgoing dangers from Iran and other possible problematic states of the south – for example Pakistan after an Islamic revolution – with the aim to create with the US a global defence system against ballistic missiles?
After the exit of the KSE and INF slow-acting, the sharp attacks on the American militaristic politics and the discontent with the work of the NATO Russia advice, do the menaces mean that it is about (Moscow) a comprehensive reorganization of European security? Or does one make too much problem itself over fundamental security political intentions, because the Kremlin returns essentially only to the tradition of Soviet diplomacy of the “use of contradictions between and in imperialistic centres of power” – under nowadays conditions thus between the US and Europe and between the “old” and “new” Europe?
Just before the stone Putin threw into the transatlantic water at the Munich safety conference, and the waves which spread since then on both sides of the Atlantic, the modernization of the nuclear-strategic potential in Moscow had as its priority conventional armament. Does the campaign provide a basis against the stationing of American defence systems in Europe mainly to legitimate in any case an already started armament jostle, either for the nuclear-strategic or for conventional weapons?
To what extent is the Russian attitude not determined by strategic and rational considerations, but by tactical and more difficultly understandable psychological factors?
Finally it is to be examined to what extent factors relating to domestic affairs come into play. Possibly, the sabre-rattling can contribute a trouble-free handover of power at the presidential elections in December 2007 and the parliamentary elections in March 2008.
Consecutively, these interpretations should be examined for their soundness. Finally, the West’s reaction to the Russian attitude should be dealt with. is to be dealt with how one should react on the part of the west to the Russian attitude.
Russian threat conceptions
“Iran does not menace Europe”, declared Putin apodictically in Munich. The global American strategic defence system is not at all directed against “rogue states”, but against Russia. The same theory was supported by high-ranking Russian politicians and militaries during the exit of the US from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty 1972) at the end of the Yeltsin era and at the beginning of Putin’s term of office. Thereby, Russian safety interests would be affected.
This was exactly what the commander of the Strategic rocket troops, General Nikolaj Solovyov , stated in mid-February 2007: the American program for anti-missile defence would “certainly affect the strategic equilibrium”. Russia would be “forced to seize counter measures”. Not even one month later, however, after the flaming up of severe controversies over a possible new arms race, General Solovyov revised his assessment and explained: “the stationing of elements of the American anti-missile defence system (in Poland and Czech Republic) will substantially not affect our strategic components.” These system elements “will not be able to intercept our ballistic intercontinental missiles”. Also the commander of Russian air forces, General Vladimir Miachjlow, demonstrated the potential American systems in Europe as “innocuous” for Russia, particularly since these are “stationary” and they do not deal with “attack weapons”.
In fact, ten interceptor missiles set up in Poland would have practically no effects on Russian global anti ballistic potential. First, it has to be considered that the systems planned for stationing in Poland are not attack weapons, which can be used for a first-stroke against Russian missiles.
Second, Russia has redundant offensive abilities at its disposal, which were not even scratched with the employment of less than a dozen interceptor missiles. At present it possesses over 15.000 nuclear warheads, of which about 3.300 are ready for use and foreseen for strategic carrier means. These are distributed on approximately 500 land-based strategic booster rockets (1.843 ballistic missiles), 624 sea-based rockets (624 ballistic missiles) and 78 airplanes of the strategic bomber fleet (827 ballistic missiles).
Third, the flight path of Russian country or sea-based intercontinental missiles would lead to an employment against the US not across Europe, but across the pole cap. In East-Central Europe the stationed interceptor missiles could thus not reach ballistic missiles fired from Central Russia or the North Sea.
To conclude, the menace conceivability, which comes into play because of Moscow, does not concern the dangers that arise from a limited American defence system in East-Central Europe, but rather from an extensive global anti-missile defence system, which covers resources in East-Central Europe.
Towards the end of the Yeltsin era, a conflict over which armament projects, conventional or nuclear strategic, should receive priority financing, occurred between the Ministry of Defence and the command of the armed forces. In Putin’s first term of office, the decision fell in favour of the nuclear strategic weapons. The establishment of an “international perceived equality” of Russia with the US was thereby the clear guiding idea. This was reflected also in May 2002 in Moscow, with the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT), in which the number of nuclear strategic ballistic missiles of both powers was limited to 1.700-2.200 per each. The guiding idea of the equality forms also the basis of the “Common explanation of the new strategic relations between the US and Russia” on the same date.
According to Russian explanations, however, parity with the US is not symmetrical, but rather is understood as asymmetrical. In its argumentation against the American exit from the ABM Treaty it was already demonstrated that Moscow would not intend to establish, similar to American plans, an anti-missile defence system directed against the US.
In response to the exit of the US from the ABM Treaty, the Russian government avows formally for ineffective its simultaneous ratification under reservation of the Start-2 Treaty, and thereby puts itself into the position to station rockets with several, individually guidable warheads (MIRV). These systems make an effective missile defence more difficult.
The production of modern intercontinental missiles, for example the SS-27 (Topol-M). Currently, the inventory amounts to 42 rockets of SI long-distance version and three of the mobile type. Expert estimations are that Russia will have set up about 70 (in circulation in Silos) and/or 50 (mobile) SS-27 within the year 2015.
The more ambitious development of the SLBMs system. The production of new missiles withy multiple warheads by 2015 can assure equity with the US.
The Russian point of view is very critical concerning the fact that Sharpen stands the American military policy in Europe. In the Munich Conference on Security Policy, Putin accused the US of having “exceeded their national borders in any aspects” and to want to “impose” their politics upon other countries. Obviously, with regard to the US, he deplored: “We become today witnesses of an almost unrestricted hyper-application of force, military force, in the international relations, a force, which overthrows the world into an abyss of permanent conflicts.” Back in Moscow it complained that Russia, for implementing/fulfilling the regulations of the adapted CFE Treaty, had withdrawn all its heavy weapons from the European part of Russia behind the Urals and had “recently” reduced its troops to 300.000 men, but “our partners fill Eastern Europe with new weapons – a new base in Bulgaria, another base in Romania, a rocket launching area and new rockets in Poland, a radar plant in the Czech Republic…”
NATO and the US are closely connected to each other, from the Russian point of view. Looking at the presence of smaller, more mobile American task forces in Romania and Bulgaria the difference between the US and NATO becomes indistinct: the US, as Putin says, set up “so-called flexible American front bases”; with it, “it emerges clearly that NATO shifted its front forces to our borders”. Like during the Soviet era, NATO is now also considered the most important instrument of American influence in Europe. According to this point of view, the NATO eastern enlargement serves the expansion of American influence in Europe at the expense of Russia. And this process is going to continue for the American agenda with the admission of Georgia and Ukraine into the western alliance. Despite the co-operation of Russia with NATO in the NATO-Russia Council, criticism culminates in this statement: “the expansion of NATO has nothing to do with the modernization of the alliance
or with the guarantee of security in Europe. Far from it. It represents a serious provocation…”
From the Russian perception, the provocation obviously stands less on the composition of the system-elements of missile defence, be that American or NATO systems, but in the military infrastructure and military presence of the US and NATO in the former Member States of the Warsaw Pact and in the republics of the former Soviet Union – in a broad zone, which extends from the Baltic Sea to the Black and Caspian seas (and to central Asia). Accordingly, Russian politicians and military turned against all “ballistic missiles” of NATO in the Baltic States, as well as against the integration of these states into the common aerial defence of the western alliance. The general deputy boss of the headquarters at that time Balujewskij declared that he “did not believe that it is in the interest of NATO to aggravate the situation at the Russian border, because we could take adequate (counter-) measures”.
For missile defence, the actual challenge from the Russian perception is the fact that in Poland and in the Czech Republic – both former members of the Warsaw Pact – long term American military bases will be built. On the contrary, the actual importance of such a base for Warsaw is not its missile defence ability, but the firmer connection of the US with Poland and the larger feeling of security, which results in the opposition of a Russia which is alarmingly developed in domestic and foreign policy, from a Polish view.
The “penetrating” of US and NATO into the space considered by Russia as being within its own sphere of influence as a provocation is justified by Moscow through the refusal of NATO states to ratify the CFE Treaty. According to Russian interpretation, the refusal would serve to station NATO troops into those countries which have not ratified the CFE and have not signed the CFE. This concerns the Baltic States and Slovenia – political “grey areas” for armament-control, in Russian terminology. Besides, it is inadmissible to make the ratification of CFE dependent on the redemption of the commitment received from Russia in Istanbul in 1999 to dismantle the military bases in Georgia and Moldova and to remove their troops together with munitions from there. In addition the departure from Georgia, now accelerated, is taking place, and the troops in Moldova would be seen as peacekeeping forces. Russia feels disadvantaged also by the flank regulations specified in the Treaties and wants to eliminate them. Finally, it wants to know the exact number of fixed troops (probably a brigade
as a maximum), which corresponds to the commitment, storied by the NATO in the NATO-Russia- basic record and in other documents, to station “no substantial combat forces” in the new NATO Members’ territories.
The dirges about the CFE, however, seem to be artificial, because in practice none of the 30 signatory States have exceeded the borders defined in the Treaty for the five contract-relevant weapons categories (tanks, armoured tracked vehicles, artillery, helicopters and combat aircraft, specified in the contract as treaty limited equipment (TLE)). To rearm conventionally, if this was intended, the Kremlin would not need at all to step out of the Treaties, because also Russia falls below the maximum limits, which were specified for it. Also unclear, is why the new NATO members are regarded as a military problem in the context of the Treaties, since the 26 old and new NATO-States together have taken 33% fewer weapons of all categories than the 16 members of the Alliance of 1991; in addition, the decreasing number of troops in NATO continues. The armed forces of the four NATO States outside the CFE Treaty system have solely symbolic meaning. So the military “menace” of the Baltic Countries consists of three tanks of Soviet design (T-55) in Latvia and four aircrafts (L-39), which can be designated/identified only with large trouble as “combat aircrafts”. What concerns the stationing of foreign troops, since it is not possible to talk about “substantial combat forces”, is those on the airbase Zokniai in Lithuania on rotation basis stationing.
Parliamentary elections will take place in Russia in December 2007, and presidential elections in March 2008, at which President Putin will not be eligible anymore, according to the Constitution. Potentially, behind the sabre-rattling there are also some tactical considerations for the Russian election campaign that is already running at full speed. The fuel of the feeling to be surrounded by enemies, and the one of the impression to be pushed around by other powers – including the US – would well fit into the strategy for guaranteeing a maximal agreement of the electorate towards the Kremlin party “United Russia” and a frictionless power handover in Spring 2008.
The occurrence of representatives of the Russian foreign and security policy establishments on the international stage shows, on the one hand, that this is shaped by new self-awareness and self-righteousness, but, on the other hand, also by the feeling of inferiority despite economic successes and the self-declared status as a “energy
superpower” not to be taken seriously or not seriously enough. Important evidence of such feelings was delivered by the chairman of the Russian federation council, Sergej Mironov, in conjunction with the exit from the CFE Treaty menaced by Putin. “The exit from the Treaty does not mean that we now start to install any armoured troops”, he elucidated, “one must deal only in partnership with us”. This would be possible if one had confidence into the democratic and constitutional development. But this confidence is lacking in the US and far away in East-Central Europe, and representatives of these countries openly addressed it in different international forums – for example Federal Chancellor Merkel at the EU-Russia Summit in Samara in May 2007.
This leads to a last possible motivation for the coming Russian campaign, that Putin can receive an internal discredit. More, the murder of Anna Politkovskaja raised abroad the criticism of the journalists.
Considering the Bush Government actions in Afghanistan and Iraq, Russia has been considered for European Countries sometimes as a possible partner for dialogue.
Conclusion
The questions initially placed can be answered now as follows:
1. The Muscovite foreign and safety political establishment does not feel menaced by the possible stationing of resources of an American anti-missile defence in East-Central Europe. The actual challenge, according to Russian perception, is situated in the setup of any military infrastructure and military presence of the US and NATO in the former Warsaw Pact Member states and in the republics of the former Soviet Union and therein, such as in Poland and the Czech Republic – both countries former Warsaw Pact Member states – American Military bases could be built in the long term. The stop of such projects and a repeated Eastern enlargement of NATO (Georgia, Ukraine) is the most important element of the Russian reaction to the American anti-missile defence plans.
2. In Russia, possible increasing threats in the south and the east of the country are also taken seriously. The Kremlin and its Generals point out that already, countries such as North Korea, South Korea, India, Iran, Pakistan and Israel have at their disposal rockets of shorter and middle range and that other countries are working on such development. This is a “real menace”, which makes the acquisition of new precise weapons necessary.
modernization of short distance-rockets as well as the research and development works on nuclear medium range weapons is thus not any short-term reaction to the planned stationing of American defence components in east Central Europe, but it is the realization of an agenda, which had been discussed already years ago in the Russian Ministry of Defence (also with the US) in the connection with the menaces from the south.
1. This also concerns the modernization of nuclear-strategic armed forces. This is part of the nuclear-strategic armament project conceived on a long-term basis, whose purpose is to achieve at least the appearance that Russia is “equal” to the US. The emphasis of modernization is on offensive weapons and the development of multiple warheads (MIRV), including more manoeuvrable ones (MARV), which could also overcome a comprehensive American anti-missile defence (e.g. in Alaska and California). Regarding the defence systems planned for East-Central Europe, it does not concern nuclear offensive weapons, which could menace Russia. The nuclear-strategic modernization projects of Russia stand thereby in no material connection.
1. American plans for the stationing of parts of an anti-missile defence in Europe are directed against potential dangers from the unstable Near and Middle East, and not against Russia. Moreover, the national maximum limits specified in CFE by the NATO States are fallen below and no extensive combat troops of foreign powers (e.g. the US) were shifted into the new NATO Member States. For all these reasons, the Russian menaces have an artificial character with the exit from the CFE and INF Treaties, and with a new arms race. The climbing campaign on this appears like shadow boxing; with the help of museum pieces of the Cold War, illusory confrontations are projected to European cave walls. Since the basis (confidence) for a comprehensive re-organization of European security structures – because of the domestic affairs development in Russia and Putin’s pressing politics in the post Soviet area – is missing, European governments and parliaments would be well advised to react to the Muscovites threats with imperturbability.
http://www.tesionline.it/tesiteca_docs/33078/Il_sistema_di_difesa_europeo.pdf
