Is the European Union in some way to blame for the fate of Ukraine? That idea has been popularised by the British politician, NigelFarage, who has argued that Europe has “blood on its hands” in Ukraine – apparently because the Europeans irresponsibly encouraged Ukrainian aspirations to “join Europe”, without thinking what they would do, if Russia reacted aggressively. Mr Farage has been roundly denounced for taking this line. But he is not alone in making the charge that the EU is at fault. I’ve heard similar sentiments expressed by Asian and American policymakers.
So is it fair to blame the EU? Not, I think, in any direct way. The thugs who shot demonstrators in Kiev were not acting on orders from Brussels. It is not even fair to say that Europe should have seen this coming. The whole crisis has been a chapter of unforseen developments which – at various times – caught the Russians and Americans by surprise, as well. Above all, it was hard to forsee that – just hours after signing a deal with the three EU foreign ministers – President Yanukovitch would order (or allow) scores of his own people to be gunned down, and would then flee the country.
However, I do think it is fair to argue that the EU has never really had a Ukraine strategy. At no point, has it really worked out what the desired end-point of policy towards Ukraine should be – and what this might require in terms of resources and risks. Instead, it treated policy towards Ukraine as a technical exercise, involving negotiating a trade deal with a large neighbour that might, one day, be a candidate for membership of the EU. But while the EU pretended that its relations with Ukraine were a technocratic exercise – involving compliance and regulations and lots of box-ticking – Russia saw this as high politics and geo-strategy. As a result, when the EU found itself sucked into a geo-political struggle with Russia, it was at a loss over how to respond.
Why is the EU so much more comfortable with technocracy than strategy? Partly because the whole method of the European Union is to drain away dangerous political passions, by focusing on economics and bureaucracy. As they like to joke in Brussels, “we used to shoot at each other, now we argue about fish quotas.” Technocracy has always been at the heart of the European enterprise. The ambition to develop a foreign policy and a defence identity is much more recent – and really only half-formed.
When it came to Ukraine, the EU’s inherent difficulty with thinking strategically was compounded by the fact that the EU member-states were, in fact, divided about what they wanted. Poland and the Baltic states have always wanted to put Ukraine on a clear path to membership of the European Union. Some of the western European members – France, in particular – were much more sceptical. Given this disagreement, it was much easier to avoid discussing the ultimate point of policy to Ukraine – and instead to focus on what the EU does best. Box-ticking.
Some say that the current crisis may now, belatedly, force the Europeans to take a more strategic approach to Ukraine. I’m not so sure. The problem is that the EU remains divided, as the current discussion over sanctions has revealed. The Poles and the Balts have again been taking the hardest line. The Brits have talked a good game, although its not yet clear how much they would do to damage the City. The Germans, who are obviously crucial, are divided – with Chancellor Merkel on the tough end of the spectrum, and some members of the SPD already yearning for rapprochement with Russia. The South-Eastern wing of the EU: Greece, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Hungary – is regarded as the most pro-Russian.
All international crises elicit predictions that, this time, the EU will finally be forced to grow up, and develop a real foreign policy strategy. Such expectations are usually disappointed. I don’t see why it should be any different, this time.
